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The present paper proposes that four neuromodulator systems underpin highly generalized 
behavioral sets, but each targets either dorsomedial or ventrolateral cortical systems, where 
it produces its effects in either a proactive or reactive orientation to the environment. This way 
systems are discriminated that control reactive approach (dopaminergic), reactive avoidance 
(cholinergic), proactive behavior (noradrenergic), and withdrawal (serotonergic). This model is 
compared with models of temperament, affect, personality, and so-called two-system models 
from psychology. Although the present model converges with previous models that point to a 
basic scheme underlying temperamental and affective space, at the same time it suggest that 
specific additional discriminations are necessary to improve descriptive fit to data and solve 
inconsistencies and confusions. We demonstrate how proactive and reactive actions and controls 
can be confused, and that this has many potential implications for psychology and neurobiology. 
We uncover conceptual problems regarding constructs such as effortful control, positive affect, 
approach-avoidance, extraversion, impulsivity, impulse-control, and goal-directedness of behavior. 
By delineating those problems, our approach also opens up ways to tackle them.
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In Section “The Proactive and Reactive Behavioral/Physiological 
Programs” we will start by describing separate brain systems for 
proactive and reactive modes of behavior control. Next, in Section 
“Motivational Aspects of Neuromodulator Systems”, we outline 
the neuromodulator systems that are, based for a large part on 
research with animals, hypothesized to be involved in motivation 
and behavior such as approach (the catecholamines, dopamine, and 
noradrenalin), avoidance (acetylcholine and noradrenalin), and 
withdrawal (serotonin). After that, in Section “Neuromodulation of 
Proactive and Reactive Behavioral Programs”, the different motiva-
tions and behaviors related to the neuromodulator systems will be 
united into a single framework with the distinction between proac-
tive and reactive behavior control, and this framework or model will 
be compared to models of temperament and self-regulation. Finally, 
in Section “Conceptual Issues Raised by the Model” we will discuss 
important conceptual issues that are raised by the model.
The proacTive and reacTive behavioral/
physiological programs
Traditional hypotheses described ascending neuromodulatory sys-
tems as “state-setting” or “gating” systems, to regulate arousal or 
the readiness for cortical information processing (e.g., Pribram and 
McGuinness, 1975). Such descriptions have proven to be incom-
plete, and recent experiments indicate that in addition to the rela-
tively slow, or tonic, changes in the activity of neuromodulator 
inTroducTion
The present paper proposes that four neuromodulator systems 
underpin highly generalized behavioral sets, but each targets 
either dorsomedial or ventrolateral cortical systems, where it 
produces its effects in either a proactive or reactive orientation 
to the environment. This way systems are discriminated that 
control reactive approach (dopaminergic), reactive avoidance 
(cholinergic), proactive behavior (noradrenergic), and with-
drawal (serotonergic). This model is compared with models 
of temperament, affect, personality, and so-called two-system 
models from psychology. Although the present model converges 
with previous models that point to a basic scheme underlying 
temperamental and affective space, at the same time it suggest 
that specific additional discriminations are necessary to improve 
descriptive fit to data and solve inconsistencies and confusions. 
We intend the model as a step toward a comprehensive scheme to 
make sense of multiple cognitive, motivational, and neural proc-
esses that must work together and also be distinguishable. The 
comprehensive scope of the model makes it useful for condensing 
the highly elaborative and often conflicting findings concerning 
motivational sets, cognitive controls, personality patterns, and 
their neuroanatomical and chemical substrates. In the discussion 
we demonstrate how proactive and reactive actions and controls 
can be confused, and that this has many potential implications 
for psychology and neurobiology.
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systems (over minutes), faster, transient, or phasic, components of 
activity are evoked by defined cognitive and behavioral activities. 
Therefore, in addition to the more global regulation of arousal, 
neuromodulators appear to influence and perhaps even initiate 
the processing of highly specific cognitive operations (Briand 
et al., 2007). We think both aspects of neuromodulator function 
are covered by a biologically plausible hypothesis that neuromodu-
lators are involved in the activation of “behavioral programs” that 
orchestrate different aspects of behavioral and physiological con-
trol systems into a unified program adapted to a particular set of 
contexts and conditions. These aspects of control systems include 
arousal, information processing biases, action control, specific cog-
nitive operations, and importantly, specific motivation (Tucker and 
Williamson, 1984).
In Section “Proactive and Reactive Behavioral Programs for 
Different Environmental Conditions” we will describe brain sys-
tems for reactive and proactive modes of behavior control. Because 
the distinction between dorsal proactive and ventral reactive 
systems is based for a large part on animal learning or memory 
research, we will discuss the relationship with memory systems 
in Section “The Proactive and Reactive Behavioral Programs and 
Memory”, and we will discuss the consequences for cognition in 
Section “The Proactive and Reactive Behavioral Programs and 
Cognition.” Building on the distinction between proactive and 
reactive systems, we will propose separate behavioral programs 
for proactive approach and avoidance (noradrenergic), reactive 
approach (dopaminergic), reactive avoidance (cholinergic), and 
withdrawal (serotonergic) in Section “Motivational Aspects of 
Neuromodulator Systems.”
proacTive and reacTive behavioral programs for differenT 
environmenTal condiTions
A prominent example of behavioral programs can be found in ani-
mal temperament research, where proactive and reactive tempera-
ments are found across different vertebrate species and related to 
differences in neuromodulator and stress response systems. These 
temperaments seem to play a role in the population ecology of 
the species, proactive temperament being more adaptive in stable, 
high-predictability environments while reactive temperaments 
are more adaptive in changing, low-predictability environments 
(Koolhaas et al., 1999, 2007). High predictability environments 
are those wherein models can be constructed that predict which 
actions will be effective in a given context. Only in a predictable 
environment can behavior be guided by a context model; in a low-
predictable environment behavior should be guided reactively by 
environmental feedback-control (Daw et al., 2005). Tucker and 
colleagues developed a theory of brain systems that control the 
proactive and reactive programs. Inspired by the work of Pribram 
and McGuinness (1975) and McGuinness and Pribram (1980), they 
first related the proactive or extraverted temperament to systems 
preferably modulated by noradrenalin and serotonin, and the reac-
tive or neurotic temperament to systems preferably modulated by 
dopamine and acetylcholine (Tucker and Williamson, 1984).
Based on neurophysiological and animal learning research 
Tucker, Luu, and colleagues subsequently developed their theory 
further to incorporate dorsal and ventral limbic–thalamic–cortical 
control paths (Tucker et al., 1995; Tucker and Luu, 2007). In the 
mammalian brain, two separate control paths are routed from  limbic 
networks through the frontal lobe to motor cortex (see Figure 1). 
A ventrolateral pathway proceeds from olfactory cortex through 
the orbital frontal lobe to lateral frontal cortex before reaching the 
ventral premotor and motor cortices (Goldberg, 1985; Passingham, 
1987). This ventral pathway appears to provide greater external 
constraint (i.e., reactivity) to motor control, in which external cues 
set criteria for ongoing evaluation of the action progress. A medi-
odorsal pathway proceeds from the cingulate gyrus through medial 
frontal cortex to dorsolateral frontal cortex to the premotor and 
motor areas on the lateral convexity of the hemisphere (Goldberg, 
1985; Passingham, 1987). This dorsal pathway appears to provide 
a projectional (i.e., proactive) mode of behavior control, in which 
context models and predictions guide the action toward a goal.
The proacTive and reacTive behavioral programs  
and memory
Drawing from Gabriel’s (1990) analysis of the roles of the major 
limbic–thalamic–frontal circuits in animal learning, Tucker and 
colleagues theorized that the proactive mode of action regula-
tion is linked closely to the operation of the mediodorsal corti-
colimbic pathway in the maintenance of the context for action 
and expectations based on these actions. Gabriel cites evidence 
that the dorsal pathway, with important control from the hippoc-
ampus, posterior cingulate, and dorsolateral cortex, maintains a 
cognitive representation of the context for action. This context 
model can be adjusted only gradually, through a process that may 
be described as context-updating (Tucker, 2001; Luu and Tucker, 
2003a,b; Luu et al., 2004). By contrast, when events are discrepant 
with expectancies, either from stimulus-associations or context 
model, a more rapid, focused form of learning is engaged, in which 
previous associations are disrupted and a new set of contingencies 
may be attended effectively. Gabriel’s (1990) research has suggested 
that this new learning in response to context violation requires the 
ventral circuit that involves the amygdala, ventral striatum, ante-
rior cingulate cortex (ACC), mediodorsal nucleus of the thalamus, 
anterior temporal, insula, and the orbitofrontal and ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortices (Price, 1999; Bussey et al., 2001; Phillips et al., 
2003a; Saleem et al., 2008). See Table 1 for an overview of central 
characteristics of the ventral and dorsal systems and their associ-
ated behavioral programs.
This model of learning bears resemblance to the model of 
memory systems proposed by O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) and Nadel 
(1992). According to those authors, several factors distinguish hip-
pocampal based (“locale”) learning from non-hippocampally based 
(“taxon”) learning. Importantly, locale learning is assumed to be 
quite different from taxon learning with regard to the underlying 
systems of motivation that drive it. O’Keefe and Nadel argued that 
there is a fundamental connection between locale learning and 
exploration. The drive to acquire information, in the first instance 
about one’s environment, is taken as the force underlying locale 
learning, just as it has to be in the proactive system to enable the 
construction of context models. The drives of reactive systems, such 
as hunger and thirst, are not considered to be important in this 
system, though information about location of food, water, mates, 
and safety might well be part of what is acquired. Taxon learning, 
on the other hand, is assumed to be motivated by the traditional 
www.frontiersin.org September 2010 | Volume 1 | Article 152 | 3
Tops et al.  Neuromodulation of behavioral programs
drives (e.g., to exploit) emphasized by Hull (1943), and therefore to 
be dependent on the standard application of reinforcements. The 
locale system is the basis for providing the context within which 
context-free information from the taxon systems could be situ-
ated. In contrast with those similarities between respectively locale 
and taxon systems on the one hand, and proactive and  reactive 
systems on the other hand, quite opposite to the model of Tucker 
and  colleagues, O’Keefe and Nadel assume locale learning to be 
fast and all or none, while taxon is assumed to be slow and incre-
mental. However, O’Keefe and Nadel acknowledge that there are 
examples of taxon learning that are very fast and can occur with 
but a single pairing. We think this seeming contradiction may be 
explained by the focus in the research of O’Keefe and Nadel on 
hippocampal function, which reflects only one part of the proactive 
system, and mediates only aspects of proactive learning function, 
such as perhaps an episodic buffer. O’Keefe and Nadel compared 
only one part of one system, the hippocampus, with everything 
that is non-hippocampal (Keren and Schul, 2009).
The association of the dorsal pathway with gradual learning and 
context model-guided action control suggests that this pathway 
may be relatively more efficient in retrieval compared to encod-
ing. By contrast, the association of the ventral pathway with rapid 
learning and action control by external constraint suggests that this 
pathway may be relatively more efficient in encoding compared to 
retrieval. Indeed, recent fMRI studies support this. For instance, 
left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex was associated more with suc-
cessful encoding, whereas left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was 
associated more with successful retrieval (Prince et al., 2005; Kim 
et al., 2010). In a meta-analysis of five different fMRI studies of 
episodic memory, Daselaar et al. (2009); also Binder et al. (2010) 
and Kim et al. (2010) found that successful retrieval was associated 
Figure 1 | Left: primary direction of corticolimbic traffic for organizing 
output from limbic integration toward specific action modules in the 
motor cortex. Two separate control paths are routed from limbic networks 
through the frontal lobe to motor cortex. A ventrolateral pathway proceeds from 
olfactory cortex through the orbital frontal lobe to lateral frontal cortex before 
reaching the ventral premotor and motor cortices (ventral/bottom arrows). 
A mediodorsal pathway proceeds from the cingulate gyrus through medial 
frontal cortex to dorsolateral frontal cortex to the premotor and motor areas on 
the lateral convexity of the hemisphere (upper/dorsal arrows). Right: primary 
direction of corticolimbic traffic for integrating perception from specific modules 
in the sensory cortex (in this case the arrows start from the visual area) toward 
the limbic cortex shown for dorsal (upper arrows) and ventral (bottom arrows).
Table 1 | Characteristics of the ventrolateral and mediodorsal systems
 Ventrolateral Mediodorsal 
 system system
Origin Paleocortical Archicortical
Visceral functional Viscerosensory Visceromotor 
base
Adaptive in Low-predictable/ High-predictable/ 
environment changing stable
Cognitive mode Object Configural
Motor control Feedback/ Feedforward/ 
 reactive proactive
Learning stage Early Late
Working memory bias Redundancy Habituation
Attention Focused Global
Neuromodulators Dopamine,  Serotonin,  
 acetylcholine noradrenalin
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Although ventral and dorsal systems will usually work in 
 parallel and in interaction for many tasks, stable, and dynamic 
biases toward one or the other system may explain temperamen-
tal and state variation, respectively, in tendencies toward reactive 
or proactive programs. This claim is supported by a recent fMRI 
study, in which subjects were scanned while they adopted either a 
reflective, extended self-reference linking experiences across time 
in memory (which may involve the dorsal system) or a momen-
tary experiential self-reference centered on the present moment 
(ventral reactive). The experiential focus yielded reduced activity 
in dorsal system areas such as medial prefrontal cortex, posterior 
cingulate cortex and hippocampus, and increased engagement of 
ventral areas such as in the insula, secondary somatosensory cortex, 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal lobule. These 
effects were largest in subjects that were trained to develop focused 
attention on the present. Functional connectivity analyses further 
demonstrated a strong coupling between the insula and the ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex in untrained subjects that was uncoupled 
in the trained group (Farb et al., 2007). This decoupling may reflect 
increased ability in trained subjects to avoid rumination by disen-
gaging attentional processes of self-referential elaboration (Farb 
et al., 2007). These results suggest a fundamental neural dissociation 
between two distinct forms of self-awareness consistent with the 
dorsal and ventral programs, which are habitually integrated but 
can nevertheless vary within and between individuals in relative 
activation. For a review of neuroimaging studies showing the role 
of the insula/IFG area in awareness of the moment and emotional 
intensity, see Craig (2009); for a review of neuroimaging studies of 
the relations between dorsal areas and reflective, planfull behavior 
vs. ventral areas and reactive behavior, see Carver et al. (2008).
moTivaTional aspecTs of neuromodulaTor sysTems
The classic neuromodulator systems that project from the brain-
stem and basal forebrain, the noradrenergic, serotonergic, choliner-
gic, and dopaminergic systems, are very complex and each has been 
related to a multitude of functions at various levels (e.g., physiologi-
cal, behavioral levels) that often seem unrelated. On the other hand, 
functions at different levels that seem unrelated at first sight may 
be part of a common behavioral and physiological program. For 
behavioral scientists who want to constrain their behavioral models 
with knowledge of brain function, characterization of behavioral 
programs in terms of associated motivational aspects seems to be 
most important. Although functions, modules and other units 
may be grouped into physiological and even behavioral programs 
without aspects of motivation being involved, the phylogenetically 
old brainstem neuromodulator systems seem plausible candidates 
in the search of basic motivated programs. Indeed, despite above 
complexities, for each of the neuromodulators there are reviews 
that suggest a function in aspects of motivation.
Considering elementary control functions that have been 
conserved through evolution as part of behavioral programs, we 
propose each of the brainstem neuromodulators to have neuro-
modulatory function that can best be conceptualized as a phyloge-
netically conserved drive, “functioning in a higher-order capacity 
to integrate a variety of behavioral functions” (Lucki, 1998). Each 
of the neuromodulator systems cover a large area of influence from 
a central point of origin, which is suitable for a general regulatory 
with increased activity in posterior cingulate and precuneus, and 
posterior lateral parietal cortex, whereas successful encoding was 
associated with decreased activity in these regions. Encoding success 
and novelty detection overlapped in a ventrolateral anterior insula/
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) area (Kim et al., 2010).
The proacTive and reacTive behavioral programs and 
cogniTion
The posterior cingulate and Papez circuits of the dorsal networks 
support a positive memory bias that forms the context representa-
tion and expectancy for approach and reward (see Deakin, 2003). 
The fundamental motive tone for this control system leads actions 
to be initiated through proactive (i.e., context-predicted) control 
(Tucker et al., 1995). With preferential neuromodulation of the 
dorsal limbic and neocortical networks by noradrenalin (Foote 
and Morrison, 1987), the habituation bias integral to noradrener-
gic modulation (Tucker and Williamson, 1984) may be a mecha-
nism through which global attention, configural working memory, 
and gradual learning are incorporated within the context model 
with minimal disruption of the representation (Luu and Tucker, 
2003a,b). Noradrenalin is distributed through the dorsal pathways 
(Morrison and Foote, 1986), and regulated by those pathways 
(Arnsten and Goldman-Rakic, 1984). Indeed, noradrenergic and 
serotonergic antidepressants increase positive biases in the process-
ing of emotional material (e.g., Harmer et al., 2004; Serra et al., 
2006; Norbury et al., 2007) and appear to shift activity from ventral 
to dorsal networks (see Tucker and Luu, 2007; Carver et al., 2008; 
Tops et al., 2009).
By contrast, the recognition of discrepancy or threat, medi-
ated by the ACC and IFG with inputs from reactive ventral lim-
bic networks (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Sridharan et al., 
2008), leads to a suppression of the context model, an engage-
ment of focused attention, focus on and awareness of the present 
moment, and the capacity for rapid reorganization of behavioral 
contingencies. Neuromodulators of the ventral system provide a 
redundancy bias to working memory (Tucker and Williamson, 
1984), focusing attention on potential discrepancies, threats, and 
rewards, and mediating the frustration that may guide further 
learning and adaptive control. This redundancy bias in working 
memory also supports perseverative cognition (Brosschot, 2010) 
such as apprehensive worry and rumination. In humans, in the 
more subtle actions of this regulatory influence, the vigilance for 
discrepant events leads to a focused, analytic mode of cognition 
that is congruent with highly constrained, feedback control of 
ongoing cognition and action.
In summary, focusing on the contrast between noradrenergic 
and dopaminergic modulation (Tucker and Williamson, 1984), the 
dorsal or noradrenalin system supports perceptual orienting, yet 
this system achieves its major attentional control through increas-
ing habituation. The system responsible for augmenting neural 
activity in response to perceptual input thus simultaneously decre-
ments further response to input to facilitate proactive and context 
model-guided control. The ventral or dopaminergic system, which 
increments brain activity to support motor output and readiness, 
also facilitates a tight momentary control of behavior by a continu-
ous stream of external or internal stimuli, or inhibition of behavior 
during redundant processing of aspects of stimuli.
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stimuli without involving the context model, and feedback from 
the stimulus  environment should not interfere with the proactive 
control of motor responding; attention is modulated by the context 
model instead of exclusively focused on the threat stimulus. In 
these aspects the noradrenergic proactive avoidance responding 
is different from the reactive avoidance we will discus in Section 
“Acetylcholine: The Drive to Avoid.”
The proactive and reactive programs appear to have evolved 
because they are adaptive in stable, predictable, and in low predict-
ability, changing environments, respectively (Koolhaas et al., 1999). 
The behaviors that are adaptive in stable vs. changing environments 
have also been characterized as “exploration” (essential in construct-
ing context models to serve the proactive program) vs. “exploitation” 
(reactive appetitive), respectively (Cohen et al., 2007). Evidence sug-
gests that dopaminergic systems mediate exploitation (Daw et al., 
2006) while noradrenalin neurons in the locus coeruleus have been 
suggested to mediate shifts between exploration and exploitation 
(Usher et al., 1999). Alternatively, if noradrenalin in the locus coeru-
leus is involved in a proactive program, then it may apply network 
reset and modulate switching between goal-directed and exploratory 
behaviors, which is necessary for switching between proactive goal-
behavior repertoires, so as to permit rapid behavioral adaptation to 
changing environmental imperatives and context switches. It may 
be that unexpected changes in the world – within the context of a 
proactive behavioral program – activate a noradrenergic interrupt 
signal in order to search for alternative behavioral repertoire within 
the proactive program (Usher et al., 1999; Yu and Dayan, 2005). On 
the other hand, locus coeruleus noradrenalin may be involved in 
switching between the proactive control phases of deliberation and 
post-decision implementation (Einhauser et al., 2010).
The dopaminergic and noradrenergic systems are different sys-
tems with different drive functions, which we characterize, follow-
ing the discussion in the previous section, as “reactive approach” 
and “proactive approach and avoidance”, respectively. However, 
they seem similar in the way they oppose, and are opposed by, the 
serotonergic and cholinergic systems, and energize behavior (e.g., 
Mawson, 1999). We think these similarities together with other fac-
tors are the cause of conceptual confusion we return to in Sections 
“Neuromodulation of Proactive and Reactive Behavioral Programs” 
and “Conceptual Issues Raised by the Model.”
aceTylcholine: The drive To avoid
Especially in reactive systems, the drive to approach seems in 
natural opposition to a drive to avoid. Acetylcholine seems to be 
implicated in a drive to avoid, i.e., in anxiety. Brainstem cholin-
ergic projections induce a rapid, transient elevation of vigilance 
level by their phasic response to novel, unfamiliar stimuli (Kayama 
and Koyama, 2003). Basal forebrain cortical cholinergic activity 
may foster the attentional processing of threat-related stimuli and 
associations, and thereby contribute to cortical/cognitive aspects 
of anxiety (Berntson et al., 2003). In healthy male volunteers the 
behavioral and cardiovascular sensitivity to a centrally active 
cholinergic stimulant correlated significantly with “irritability” 
and “emotional lability” as well as with habitually passive strate-
gies in stress coping (Fritze et al., 1995). Acetylcholine has been 
proposed to signal expected uncertainty, coming from known 
unreliability of  predictive cues within a context (Yu and Dayan, 
system (Clark, 1979). The projections of those systems apply a 
neurophysiological modulatory influence, and this has very general, 
vectoral drive properties, meaning that behavior is oriented in a 
certain direction. A general phylogenetically conserved drive or 
behavioral program theory of neuromodulator function in behav-
ior can help to account for why each neuromodulator appears to 
influence so many behaviors, but also is an unlikely neurotransmit-
ter to be the principle or sole mediator of any of these behaviors 
(Lucki, 1998).
The caTecholamines dopamine and noradrenalin: differenT 
drives To approach
Activity in midbrain dopamine neurons has been shown to be 
related to signaling the rewarding value of events and actions 
(Schultz, 2002). Most midbrain dopamine neurons exhibit burst 
activity following delivery of primary rewards. They respond to 
both rewards (with activation) and punishments/reward omission 
(mostly with depression; Ungless et al., 2004). This dopaminer-
gic activity, however, appears to depend on the predictability of 
the reward, such that unpredicted rewards elicit dopaminergic 
activation and an unpredicted non-reward induces a depression 
in dopamine activity, while fully predicted rewards do not elicit 
dopamine activity (Schultz, 2002). The dopaminergic response 
has been associated with the “wanting” or “drive” aspect of 
reward processing that facilitates approach, or frustration when 
attractive stimuli are out of reach, and not so much with the 
“liking” aspect (Berridge, 2007). For instance, in an fMRI study 
of cocaine-dependent subjects drug-induced “high” feeling was 
found to correlate negatively with activity in regions including the 
ventral striatum (nucleus accumbens), ACC and IFG while crav-
ing correlated positively with activity in these regions (Risinger 
et al., 2005).
The noradrenalin-driven locus coeruleus is believed to be 
aroused in active coping efforts to maintain or gain control (Henry, 
1993) and in response to unexpected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan, 
2005). High noradrenergic activity has been related to aggression 
and assertiveness (Haller et al., 1998; Tse and Bond, 2006), possibly 
because aggression is often involved in the (re)gaining of control 
and proactive coping (Henry, 1993). McClelland et al. (1980) pro-
posed that brain noradrenalin mediates a power drive, i.e., a drive 
to gain control. The locus coeruleus modulates vigilance and the 
initiation and energizing of adaptive behavioral responses (Aston-
Jones et al., 1994).
Because many readers will associate noradrenalin with stress-
responding and anxiety, it is important to discuss the differences 
between the (pro)active avoidance behaviors that appear to be 
modulated by noradrenergic systems, and passive, inhibitory 
and reactive avoidance and withdrawal that will be discussed in 
the next two sections. In the present framework the association 
of noradrenergic function with active coping is explained by the 
guidance of avoidance behaviors by context models. The encod-
ing of adaptive active coping behaviors in context models and the 
associated positive expectancy bias that these behaviors will be 
successful, facilitates adaptive, context-dependent proactive cop-
ing responses guided by those context models (Tucker et al., 1995; 
Koolhaas et al., 1999). This is associated with high arousal and alert-
ness, but at the same time not directly controlled by environmental 
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levels of subjective energy and social activity, positive emotional 
biases or defenses, and reward orientation and impulsivity; also 
serotonin has been related to positive emotional biases, positive 
social engagement, social potency, and aspects of dominance (see 
Nutt et al., 2007; Carver et al., 2008; Tops et al., 2009; Sections “The 
Catecholamines Dopamine and Noradrenalin: Different Drives 
to Approach” and “Serotonin: The Drive to Withdraw”). These 
biases are opposite to, or contrast as very different from, reactive 
avoidance or neuroticism. By contrast, while antidepressants are 
used that stimulate noradrenalin, serotonin or dopamine, recently 
anticholinergic antidepressants are developed (Howland, 2009). 
The cholinergic–adrenergic hypothesis of mood disorders states 
that depression would be the clinical manifestation of a state of 
cholinergic dominance, whereas mania would reflect noradrenergic 
dominance (Fritze et al., 1995; Howland, 2009). In conclusion, of 
the neuromodulators considered, only acetylcholine seems to fit 
the profile of a neuromodulator of a reactive avoidance program. 
However, in future work the distinction between proactive and 
reactive avoidance should be worked out further, so as to determine 
whether noradrenergic systems cannot account for (aspects of) 
reactive avoidance as well.
seroTonin: The drive To wiThdraw
We have proposed that serotonin functions as a neuromodula-
tor of a drive to withdraw: a phylogenetically conserved motive 
to reduce the present or anticipated environmental stimulation 
mentally or behaviorally, such as by moving into an environment 
of lower stimulation levels (Tops et al., 2009; see also Lowry et al., 
2009). Serotonin exerts an inhibitory influence on behavior (see 
Lucki, 1998) and decreases responsiveness to motivational stimuli, 
increasing restraint by allowing for responding to cues of longer-
term outcomes and delay of gratification (Depue, 1995; Carver and 
Miller, 2006). Functional roles of serotonergic projections from the 
dorsal raphe nucleus to upper brain structures have been investi-
gated by recording neural activity in this nucleus, and by observing 
effects of stimulation of this nucleus (Kayama and Koyama, 2003). 
According to these authors, action on upper brain is inhibitory in 
spite of waking-specific activity of the neurons.1 The serotonergic 
systems serves to dampen and oppose the actions of the dopamin-
ergic, noradrenergic, and cholinergic systems, for example by pro-
moting behavioral inhibition and cortical de-arousal (Robbins, 
1997). Thus, serotonin promotes satiety, sleep, quiet non-aroused 
waking, parasympathetic activation, and the anti-stress relaxation 
response. Low serotonin and (hypothetically) frustration of the 
drive to withdraw will increase irritability (Tops et al., 2009).
Ellison (1979) showed that the low-serotonin animal can be 
thought of as being in a state of central functioning appropriate 
for any animal out in the environment, foraging for food: it is 
2005) and hence may, like dopamine, bias behavior toward ven-
tral system control that is adaptive in changing, low predictable 
environments.
Although the striatum has been strongly implicated in dopamin-
ergic reward processing, it should be noted that evidence indi-
cates that cholinergic and dopaminergic systems work together to 
produce the coordinated functioning of the striatum (Zhou et al., 
2003). Especially in the striatum, the dense mingling of dopamin-
ergic and cholinergic constituents enables potent interactions. 
Moreover, acetylcholine-mediated mechanisms might be of cru-
cial importance in processing the cortical inputs to the striatum 
(Calabresi et al., 2000). A recent study found that cholinergic but 
not dopaminergic projections to the basal ganglia carry reward 
omission information (Joshua et al., 2008). A role of a choliner-
gic activation system in facilitating detection of stimuli associated 
with punishment, failure, or reward omission has been suggested 
previously (Gray, 1989; Boksem et al., 2006). Similarly, Sarter et al. 
(2006) review evidence indicating that increases in the activity of 
cortical cholinergic inputs represent a major component of the 
neuronal circuitry mediating increases in what they call “attentional 
effort.” These cortical cholinergic inputs mediate effortful cogni-
tive control that is engaged when negative or aversive events and 
response outcomes signal that goals are not being achieved, mak-
ing effort necessary. Such negative events may encompass aversive 
outcomes such as error detection, reward loss, and punishment 
(Sarter et al., 2006).
In light of the wide-spread cholinergic projections to the cortex 
and its involvement in many aspects of cognition, it is important 
to stress that a label such as “avoidance” may not do justice to 
the complexity of cholinergic functions. We only use labels such 
as approach and avoidance to stress motivational aspects and to 
position the programs in relation to papers in which these labels 
are often mentioned. We envision that cholinergic systems have a 
general function, perhaps comparable to noradrenalin, but comple-
mentary to it in the sense that it is associated with reactive control. 
The contrast between central noradrenergic and cholinergic func-
tion may be similar to their peripheral functions in the sympathetic 
and parasympathetic autonomic nervous system, respectively. The 
sympathetic system provides a global, feed-forward, proactive 
response to challenge, while the parasympathetic system fine-tunes 
the response, more tightly guided by detailed environmental feed-
back control (Porges et al., 1996). The reactive avoidance behav-
ioral program is a program for low-predictable environments or 
circumstances, in which threats are judged to outweigh opportuni-
ties. This situation, and associated kind of control, may have been 
dominant in many species, environments, and periods in evolu-
tion, and this behavioral program may have developed into a very 
general and versatile program that is nevertheless biased toward 
reactive avoidance. Moreover, the more recent cognitive control 
elaborations of the ventral systems provide essential capabilities 
to present day humans.
In our model, reactive avoidance stands out from the other 
motivations in terms of motivational and affective biases: reactive 
avoidance is associated with negative affective biases (Tucker et al., 
1995), while approach and (pro)active avoidance are facilitated 
by positive biases (Carver et al., 2000). Indeed, noradrenergic and 
dopaminergic neuromodulation seem to be characterized by high 
1The study by Kayama and Koyama (2003) also investigated noradrenergic projec-
tions originating in the locus coeruleus and cholinergic projections from neurons 
gathering in the laterodorsal tegmental nucleus and scattering in the pedunculo-
pontine tegmental nucleus. They conclude that the noradrenergic projection is a 
rather tonic activating system, but it also elevates vigilance levels transiently with 
phasic sensory responses. The cholinergic projections induce a rapid, transient ele-
vation of vigilance level by their phasic response to novel, unfamiliar stimuli. This 
seems consistent with proactive and reactive control modes modulated by noradre-
nalin and acetylcholine, respectively. Additionally, a group of cholinergic neurons 
constitutes a system to induce and maintain paradoxical sleep.
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into proactive and reactive behavioral programs, produces a model 
that is very similar to a model that has recently been proposed to 
integrate literature on temperament and self-regulation systems, 
serotonin function, psychopathology, and neuroimaging (Carver 
et al., 2008, 2009). However, we think our behavioral programs 
approach has additional strengths compared to theirs. Specifically, 
we think our model uncovers important conceptual problems and 
also opens up ways to address those problems. Tackling conceptual 
issues will also help in comparing our approach to other research 
that suggested related distinctions between dorsal and ventral 
 networks associated with top-down/goal-directed vs. stimulus-
driven attention, executive control vs. salience-detection, attention 
vs. emotion, aspects of emotion perception, resting state connectiv-
ity, visceromotor vs. viscerosensory function and psychopathology, 
although it is beyond the space limits of this paper to address all 
those comparisons directly (Price, 1999; Corbetta and Shulman, 
2002; Yamasaki et al., 2002; Phillips et al., 2003a,b; Fox et al., 2006; 
Seeley et al., 2007).
Figure 2 is a depiction of the two reactive motivational systems, 
i.e., the dopamine-linked reactive approach system and the acetyl-
choline-linked reactive avoidance system, and of the noradrenalin- 
and serotonin-linked proactive approach and avoidance system. 
Inspection of this figure may raise the question why it depicts 
separate reactive approach and reactive avoidance systems, but 
not separate proactive approach and proactive avoidance systems. 
One explanation for the lack of evidence for separate proactive 
approach and proactive avoidance systems may be that the involve-
ment of the ventral systems in acute external reactivity and reactive 
responding to threat may induce time constraints that are best 
met by separate systems for the fundamentally different behaviors. 
By contrast, proactive approach and proactive avoidance may be 
guided by the same context models. Relatedly, proactive approach 
and avoidance may not be opposites as much as their reactive coun-
terparts are: proactive avoidance of threat involves active problem-
solving, a coping style that has even been termed “approach coping” 
hyper-aroused, sensitive to stimulation and vigilant. Furthermore, 
Ellison suggested two antagonistic types of positive affect (drives): 
one which pulls the animal out of hiding into the environment by 
positively rewarding it when it engages in appetitive consummatory 
responses (catecholaminergic), and another which pulls it back 
into the security of the nest by satisfying a reciprocal set of needs 
(serotonergic). The positive affects that Ellison associated with sero-
tonergic function were security and relaxation, which are proposed 
to serve functions of energy conservation and recuperation.
Another function of serotonin may lay in its relative promotion 
of dorsal systems and proactive behavior. It has been suggested that 
serotonin facilitates motor output, partly by suppressing ongo-
ing processing of sensory input that might disrupt motor output, 
thereby effectively facilitating proactive action control (Jacobs and 
Fornal, 1995). We proposed that serotonin facilitates a mode of 
proactive function that guides behavior that is best performed with-
out interference from high levels of unpredictable environmental 
stimulation (Tops et al., 2009). Most activities reflecting attachment 
behavior are most successfully maintained when the organism is 
relatively relaxed and free from challenge by the need for self-pres-
ervation. Serotonergic sanguinity and comfort may be important 
to the facilitation of social interactions by reducing the associated 
anxiety and inhibition. We proposed that serotonin is involved in 
the type of social interactions, in which immediate reward value 
is traded for delayed rewards. To do so, serotonin decreases both 
aversive and appetitive reactivity. The drive for these low-arousal 
social behaviors may have been derived from a serotonergic drive 
to withdraw into a safe place or comfort. We speculate that the 
development of phylogenetically more recent social and cognitive 
functions may have led to the increasing complexity and number 
of serotonergic system receptor sub-types and some co-selection of 
both ventral and dorsal elements in most recent sub-systems.
Other motivational functions of serotonin have been suggested 
in the literature. Serotonin has been suggested to be implicated in 
harm avoidance and anxiety (e.g., Deakin, 2003). However, in that 
literature the drive to avoid is not discriminated from the drive to 
withdraw. We argue elsewhere that serotonergic function is more 
likely to relate to a drive to withdraw than to a drive to avoid (Tops 
et al., 2009, also for references to other authors arguing against 
direct involvement of serotonin in a drive to avoid or anxiety). 
Another hypothesis, that serotonin decreases immediate stimulus 
reactivity and increases future orientation, which may promote 
behaviors that could be described as proactive avoidance (Carver 
et al., 2008, 2009), we think is compatible with the present one. 
However, we think a role in future orientation is derived from a 
phylogenetically more basic function in withdrawal: perceptions 
of environmental resource availability and feeding state motivate 
organisms to withdraw in order to conserve energy and recover, 
while in more recent evolutionary history additionally future ori-
ented behaviors and cognitions may be facilitated (Russo et al., 
2009; Tops et al., 2009).
neuromodulaTion of proacTive and reacTive 
behavioral programs
We now turn to models of temperament and self-regulation. We 
do this because we believe that combining (a) the four behavioral 
programs related to the neuromodulators with (b) the division 
Figure 2 | Three temperamental influences (and associated 
neuromodulators) on behavior that reflect different behavioral programs. 
A reactive system for approaching rewards and a reactive system for avoiding 
threats or punishment both interact, collaborate and compete with, and are 
dampened by a proactive system guided by context models or effortful 
control. This figure is inspired by Figure 1 in Carver et al. (2008, 2009) who in 
turn noted inspiration by Rothbart and others. NA, noradrenalin; DA, 
dopamine; ACh, acetylcholine; 5HT, serotonin.
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system if punishments are involved (see below and Figure 3). In a 
large population sample (n = 2230) studied at preadolescence and 
again as adolescents (Oldehinkel et al., 2004, 2007), fearful and shy 
temperaments were associated with internalizing disorders, and 
frustration and high-intensity pleasure temperaments were associ-
ated with externalizing disorders. In adolescents both associations 
were attenuated by high levels of effortful control (Oldehinkel et al., 
2007). Additionally, high frustration or irritability tended to be 
associated with both categories of disorders (Oldehinkel et al., 2004, 
2007; Baldwin and Dadds, 2008). This fits with the hypothesized 
association of both categories of reactive temperament and disor-
ders with low serotonin; low serotonin is associated with increased 
emotional reactivity, the evidence appearing strongest for irritabil-
ity (Russo et al., 2009).
concepTual issues raised by The model
Although there is a lot of conceptual confusion and imprecision in 
the two-system model literature (see Keren and Schul, 2009, and 
the discussion below), most of the evidence reviewed by Carver 
et al. (2008, 2009) seems to support our model as well. However, 
there are a few differences in our models and approach. We claim 
that our model using behavioral programs points at conceptual 
problems that may affect the model of Carver et al., as well as other 
behavioral research. We will discuss a few examples below of issues 
raised by our model.
higher-order efforTful conTrol or boTh reacTive and 
proacTive efforTful conTrol
Carver et al. (2008, 2009) conceptualize the proactive system as 
being at a “higher order” than the reactive system. This is similar to 
tendencies in two-system models and psychology in general to gen-
erate contrasts based on dichotomies such as cognitive–emotional, 
controlled–automatic, positive–negative, approach–avoidance, 
hot–cold etc. (Keren and Schul, 2009). However, the behavioral/
physiological programs approach may trigger new insights because 
(Roth and Cohen, 1986). Indeed, individuals who score high on 
measures of adaptive optimism that most likely reflect a bias toward 
proactive behavioral programs (see below) have been shown to 
confront both pleasant and unpleasant emotions and threat stimuli 
to serve active problem solving (Aspinwall et al., 2001). Finally, reac-
tive approach and reactive avoidance behavioral programs may have 
evolved because they represent two alternative adaptive strategies 
in low-predictability environments. In such environments, reac-
tive harm avoidance may evolutionary have been more adaptive 
for women who care for vulnerable children and family, whereas 
in such environments reactive approach may be more adaptive for 
men who hunt and compete for physical and social resources (Del 
Giudice, 2009), which may explain higher prevalence of internali-
zation disorders and reactive avoidance temperament in women, 
and externalization disorders and reactive approach temperament 
in men (e.g., Oldehinkel et al., 2007).
Interestingly, although Figure 2 shows the reactive behavioral 
programs and their interaction by a context-model-guided proac-
tive program, this figure is actually adapted from a figure in Carver 
et al. (2008, 2009); compared to that figure, we added “proactive 
approach and avoidance” to describe the box that originally only 
said “(deliberative) effortful control.” Carver and colleagues pre-
sented this model to explain aspects of serotonin function and 
psychopathology. They based their perspective on a set of theories 
from cognitive, social, personality, motivational, and developmental 
psychology that are often called two-system or two-mode mod-
els. Such models converge on the idea that there exist two modes 
of processing information and regulating action, which operate 
simultaneously and in competition with each other: a lower-order 
system that responds quickly to associative cues of the moment and 
a higher-order system that responds more reflectively and planfully. 
However, for the terms they used in their figure (see Figure 2) 
they chose a particular temperament model of self-regulation 
from developmental psychology (Derryberry and Rothbart, 1997; 
Posner and Rothbart, 2007). Additionally, they discuss evidence 
that those systems involve ventral, respectively dorsal cortical areas. 
And similar to what we proposed, they suggest that serotonin shifts 
activity from ventral to dorsal systems, i.e., that low serotonin is 
linked to relative dominance of the reactive systems (Tucker and 
Luu, 2007; Tops et al., 2009). They also suggest, as we did, that the 
kind of behavior manifested when serotonin is low, depends on 
biases toward either reactive approach or reactive avoidance sys-
tems (also Prange et al., 1974). Starting from a different literature 
than we do, they arrive at a similar explanation for different forms 
of psychopathology that seem associated to low serotonin (Tops 
et al., 2009).
Research in children and adolescents, some of which based on 
the temperament questionnaires developed by Rothbart and col-
leagues, found support for the model in Figure 2. For instance, there 
is significant covariation between internalizing and externalizing 
behavior that is partly explained by individual differences in emo-
tional reactivity, although there is also evidence that internalizing 
behavior is a protective factor against externalizing behavior (Rhee 
et al., 2007). This is consistent with internalizing and externalizing 
both being mediated by reactive systems and dampened by the 
proactive system or effortful control, but at the same time external-
izing behavior is inhibited or opposed by the reactive avoidance 
Figure 3 | Different kinds of self-regulation after adding effortful control 
to the temperamental influences. We introduced an “effortful control” 
element to each program from Figure 2. Taking as example the self-regulation 
of reactive approach (i.e., impulsive reward responding), this model suggests 
that reactive emotional behavior can be regulated in at least three different 
ways: (1) by regulation from the proactive system; (2) by opposition from the 
other reactive system; (3) by effortful control (constraint) within the reactive 
system itself.
www.frontiersin.org September 2010 | Volume 1 | Article 152 | 9
Tops et al.  Neuromodulation of behavioral programs
suggesting that there are two types of positive affect associated 
with different programs comes from studies of the relationship 
between positive affect and cognition. Intuitively researchers have 
linked positive affect to reward processing and dopaminergic func-
tion (e.g., Watson et al., 1999). Other researchers have discussed 
appetitive or pregoal positive states and “wanting” as being differ-
ent from consummatory or postgoal positive states and “liking” 
and argued that dopamine function is only involved in the former 
(e.g., Berridge, 2007). According to the present model, the reactive 
approach positive affect (“wanting”) of the ventral system would 
be associated with focused attention; however, there should be 
another kind of positive affect related to proactive approach and 
global attention (Table 1 and Section “The Proactive and Reactive 
Behavioral/Physiological Programs”). Moreover, whereas there is 
a positive affective bias associated with the proactive dorsal circuit, 
in moderate-temperament individuals in situations without strong 
positive incentives there is a negative affective bias associated with 
reactive ventral system function (Derryberry and Tucker, 1994). 
This negative bias to reactive function is supported by studies of 
dynamics of mood over the day, which show that while positive 
affect shows a tonic rhythm of increase in the morning and decrease 
in the evening, negative affect only shows reactivity to events 
(Watson et al., 1999). The circadian rhythm of positive affect may 
be modulated by noradrenalin, as noradrenalin has been associated 
with positive affect (Nutt et al., 2007), tonic activation (Kayama 
and Koyama, 2003)1 and circadian arousal regulation (González 
and Aston-Jones, 2006).
Studies generally support the model of Derryberry and Tucker 
(1994), finding that whereas negative affective states are associated 
relatively with increased local attention, positive affect is associated 
with more global attention (see Förster et al., 2006). Importantly, 
studies that specifically induced reactive approach-related positive 
affect (i.e., “wanting”, using pictures of desserts presented to hun-
gry volunteers) found reduced global or increased local processing 
(Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2008; Harmon-Jones and Gable, 2009). 
The results specifically supports the present model, as it is the first 
to discriminate reactive approach from proactive approach, and 
it relates the former to focused attention and the latter to global 
attention. However, related distinctions between different types of 
positive affect have been made by others.
Drawing on the review by Derryberry and Tucker (1994), the 
broaden-and-build theory of Fredrickson (2004) appears to describe 
proactive system positive affect. According to this theory some posi-
tive emotions broaden an individual’s momentary thought-action 
repertoire: joy sparks the urge to play, interest sparks the urge to 
explore, contentment sparks the urge to savor and integrate, and 
love sparks a recurring cycle of each of these urges within safe, close 
relationships. The broadened mindsets arising from these posi-
tive emotions are contrasted to the narrowed mindsets sparked by 
emotions associated with specific action tendencies, such as attack 
or flee (and reactive approach, we argue; also Gable and Harmon-
Jones, 2008). Panksepp (1998) similarly discriminates a play posi-
tive affect system and a seeking emotive system involved in reward 
obtainment. These theories have in common with each other and 
the present model that they suggest that, in addition to reactive 
approach positive affect, there are kinds of positive affect that are 
adaptive in stable, predictable, or comfortable environments and 
it suggests that elements that are not intuitively similar, connected, 
or at a similar level of complexity (perhaps even opposites in some 
ways) may nevertheless be associated with the same system: they 
may be associated with the same system because they are elements 
of the same program that is adaptive in a particular environment. 
In other words, criteria for elements to be associated to the same 
psychologically relevant system are derived from their role in an 
adaptive program instead of from intuitions of what is similar, 
compatible, or comparable.
For instance, although the reactive programs in the model of 
Tucker and colleagues include elements that appear more primitive 
(e.g., impulsive aspects of reactivity discussed below) and indeed 
may be of phylogenetically older origin and develop to completion 
at a younger age compared to the proactive system (Flechsig, 1901), 
Tucker and colleagues actually argue that in humans, in the ventral 
reactive regulatory influence, the working memory redundancy bias 
and vigilance for discrepant events leads to a focused, analytic mode 
of cognition (Tucker and Williamson, 1984). Indeed, absorption, 
which reflects reactive attention focused on the present and intense 
emotion, is associated in healthy individuals with increased working 
memory capacity and elaboration learning but relative performance 
deficiencies in tasks of memory for associative, context-dependent 
verbal material, visuospatial working memory, and executive con-
trol functions in terms of a heightened perseveration tendency and 
false positive errors (de Ruiter et al., 2006; Amrhein et al., 2008); we 
think this pattern fits with a relative bias toward reactive and away 
from the proactive program. We think that each program incorpo-
rated in its more recent elaborations elements of cognitive control. 
At the neurophysiological level this may often involve prefrontal 
cortex elaborations and different receptor subtypes (Durstewitz and 
Seamans, 2008). That is why we think detail and explaining power 
can be added to the model in Figure 2 by introducing an “effortful 
control” element to each program (Figure 3).
For comparison and consistency with Figure 2 and other litera-
ture we stayed with the term “effortful control” (Derryberry and 
Rothbart, 1997; Posner and Rothbart, 2007; Carver et al., 2008, 
2009), although we suggest that subjectively effort may be experi-
enced differently under each program. Sarter et al. (2006) review 
evidence indicating that increases in the activity of cortical cholin-
ergic inputs in response to negative events and response outcomes 
represent a major component of the neuronal circuitry mediating 
increases in “attentional effort” or effortful cognitive control. Sense 
of effort and physical exertion relate negatively to extraversion and 
positively to neuroticism, anxiety, depression (Morgan, 1994), 
and insula activity (Williamson et al., 1999; de Graaf et al., 2004). 
These findings are consistent with acute effort sense being related 
to momentary awareness and affective intensity of the moment 
(Craig, 2009) in the reactive avoidance system.
failure To discriminaTe reacTive posiTive affecT from 
proacTive posiTive affecT
In addition to suggesting that certain elements of programs that 
seem opposites actually may belong together within the same 
program, the present model also suggests the opposite: that other 
elements that are usually not discriminated actually belong to 
different programs that may even be seen as opposites in some 
regards. This may be true for two types of positive affect. Evidence 
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between reactive approach and proactive approach, respectively. 
This distinction is usually not made in psychology (but see Braver 
et al., 2009). But there are reasons to believe that this is potentially 
an important distinction, and that recognition of this distinction 
may facilitate progress in behavioral- and neurosciences.
Remember that proactive and reactive temperament seems to 
characterize two basic behavioral programs that are recognizable 
across vertebrate species (Koolhaas et al., 1999). In humans the Big 
2 of personality or temperament research are extraversion (posi-
tive affectivity) and neuroticism (negative  affectivity). It would 
make sense to expect, as Tucker and colleagues suggested, that 
extraversion and neuroticism would reflect the proactive and reac-
tive behavioral programs, respectively (Tucker and Williamson, 
1984). However, in addition to indications that extraversion 
and its associated optimistic bias are indeed related to proac-
tive approach and adaptive context model-guided behavior and 
lower risk of psychopathology, they are also linked to reactive 
approach and externalizing behavior (e.g., Taylor et al., 2003). 
Similarly, optimism may reflect optimism that context models 
remain efficient in guiding successful behavior, i.e., optimism 
about predictability, a form of optimism that is necessary for 
a bias toward proactive behavior; or reflect optimism that the 
individual has enough resources to control his environment (even 
when unpredictable) in a reactive, opportunistic way, a form of 
optimism and positive bias that characterizes narcissistic and the 
other disorders of the externalizing category. In terms of Figure 2 
it appears that reactive avoidance may be contrasted with reactive 
approach, or at other times with proactive approach, or with a 
combination of proactive and reactive approach. In other words, 
it seems that similarities to the human observer between reac-
tive and proactive approach have led to failure of measures of 
temperament to discriminate them. An observation that could 
discriminate reactive from proactive extraversion is that neu-
rotic (i.e., reactive) extraverts but not low-neurotic (proactive?) 
extraverts showed response facilitation when rewards could be 
obtained (Reed and Derryberry, 1995).
Proactive approach and reactive approach may be hard to 
discriminate from each other, both by questionnaire measures 
and observational techniques, because the phenotypical dif-
ferences between both may often be more subtle compared to 
the similarities. Like the similarities between noradrenergic and 
dopaminergic neuromodulation (Nutt et al., 2007), both seem 
to be characterized by high levels of subjective energy and social 
activity, positive emotional biases or defenses, and reward orienta-
tion and impulsivity; also serotonin has been related to positive 
emotional biases, positive social engagement, social potency and 
aspects of dominance (see Carver et al., 2008; Tops et al., 2009; 
and Section “Serotonin: The Drive to Withdraw”). Both are oppo-
site to, or contrast as very different from, reactive avoidance or 
neuroticism.
confusion beTween proacTive and reacTive impulsiviTy, 
beTween proacTive and reacTive impulse conTrol
Impulsivity is a behavioral aspect that may be importantly impli-
cated in the conceptual confusion we proposed above. Though 
widely used in research on personality, the impulsivity construct 
is far from being well defined. Different ways of measuring and 
allow for a broadening of attention and cognition (Panksepp, 1998; 
Carver, 2003; Fredrickson, 2004; Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2008). 
This broadening of attention in the proactive mode functions to 
guide play and explorative behavior and integration to construct 
context models, read contexts and to flexibly and optimally select 
and switch between context models.
Factor analyses of self-rated mood suggest that affective states 
can be described by a two-factor model (e.g., Watson et al., 
1999). One factor or dimension has been labeled alternatively 
as “ arousal–dearousal” or “engagement–disengagement”; the 
other dimension has been labeled “pleasantness–unpleasantness.” 
Alternatively, other authors argue that these factors are best rotated 
such that affective space is described by the dimensions “positive 
activation” and “negative activation.” Positive affectivity and nega-
tive affectivity are also found as traits that are related to extraver-
sion and neuroticism, respectively, and were suggested to represent 
the subjective components of broader biobehavioral systems of 
approach and withdrawal, respectively (Watson et al., 1999; Carver 
et al., 2000). We think the engagement–disengagement dimension 
may reflect the balance, as modulated by serotonin, between reac-
tive and proactive systems in Figure 2 (i.e., it may reflect the dis-
engagement of reactive systems involved in the intense experience 
of the moment, for instance due to increased suppression by sero-
tonin, effecting increased withdrawal), whereas the pleasantness–
unpleasantness dimension may reflect the balance between reactive 
approach and reactive avoidance system activation. By contrast, 
the rotated solution of negative activation and positive activation 
may contrast reactive avoidance system activation with activations 
in reactive approach and/or proactive approach systems that are 
not discriminated. We think that the present model is consistent 
with this literature, given the limitations of the used measures and 
analyses (Carver et al., 2000).
In another approach to the issue of basic dimensions of affec-
tive dispositions, two models have been proposed, one by Tellegen 
(1985), composed of positive emotionality, negative emotional-
ity, and constraint, and the other by Watson and Clark (1993), 
composed of positive temperament, negative temperament, and 
disinhibition. These models seem to fit the model in Figure 2 very 
well, assuming that constraint and inhibition reflect the regulation 
of the reactive approach and avoidance systems by the proactive 
system. However, in the next sections we will elaborate further on 
how our model points at potential confusion between different 
types of impulse control that may affect constructs such as con-
straint, impulsivity, and inhibition (Figure 3).
failure To discriminaTe proacTive and reacTive approach, 
proacTive, and reacTive exTraversion
Because positive affectivity is an important aspect of temperament 
and personality (Carver et al., 2000), if there are indeed different 
types of positive affect that belong to different temperament sys-
tems, then failure to discriminate them may impair models of tem-
perament. It is thought that positive affect is an important aspect 
of temperament because it is functionally involved in approach 
motivation (Carver et al., 2000). Hence, the implications described 
above of failing to discriminate between reactive and proactive 
types of positive affect, translate in the realm of temperament and 
personality research to consequences of failing to discriminate 
www.frontiersin.org September 2010 | Volume 1 | Article 152 | 11
Tops et al.  Neuromodulation of behavioral programs
 psychological conceptualizations arose because of two features of 
brain organization that cause (1) relationships between characteris-
tics to not confirm to intuition and (2) difficulty in discriminating 
between characteristics that share psychologically salient features. 
Such problems can only be solved when conceptualization is con-
strained by a model that takes such features of brain organization 
into account. We discussed several aspects in which our model 
differs from, or is similar to other models. However, instead of 
attempting to define the definitive, ultimate model, our main point 
is that there are two aspects of brain organization that we think may 
help developing models of behavioral control that may overcome 
limitations of previous models.
The first feature of brain organization we think is important 
is the organization into behavioral/physiological programs. The 
behavioral/physiological programs approach may trigger new 
insights because it suggests that elements that are not intuitively 
similar, connected or at a similar level of complexity, or even seem 
opposites in some ways, may nevertheless be associated with the 
same system. They may be associated with the same system because 
they are elements of the same program that is adaptive in a par-
ticular environment. In other words, criteria for elements to be 
associated to the same psychologically relevant system are derived 
from their role in an adaptive program instead of from intuitions 
of what is similar or comparable. As an example, we discussed the 
tendency in psychology to group elements together that appear 
to reflect higher levels of complexity, sophistication and cognitive 
control, and contrast these with elements that appear to reflect 
lower levels of complexity, sophistication and cognitive control. 
However, the behavioral programs approach suggests that each 
program is likely to incorporate elements from the higher and lower 
levels, even when those elements seem opposites in some regards. 
For instance, reactive systems, that may at first thinking appear 
more primitive and not reflexive, may nevertheless be associated to 
high cognitive controls such as focused attention and a redundancy 
bias in working memory; at the same time, proactive systems as 
well may be associated with types of behavioral impulsivity and 
higher cognition.
The second feature of brain organization is the organization 
into dorsomedial systems that control behavior in a proactive way 
guided by context models, and ventrolateral systems that control 
behavior in a reactive way guided by environmental feedback. 
Without a model stressing the importance of this distinction, this 
distinction may be less salient and obvious in observed behavior 
and psychological experience, compared to other features that 
proactive and reactive programs may have in common. We dis-
cussed the example of proactive and reactive forms of positive 
affect that are typically not discriminated. Because positive and 
negative affectivity are core aspects of other constructs such as 
temperament, extraversion, approach-avoidance, and impulsivity, 
failure to discriminate between reactive and proactive affect affects 
those domains as well. In the discussion we did not elaborate on 
the distinction between proactive and reactive forms of avoid-
ance, although we think this is important as well, and should be 
addressed in future work.
We do not advocate simply reorganizing psychological mod-
els around terms such as “proactive” and “reactive.” These terms 
are just as vulnerable to spurious associations and intuitions as 
operationalizing this construct have led to contradictory empiri-
cal results. Nor is it clear where impulsivity belongs in multidi-
mensional personality models. Originally included by Eysenck in 
extraversion but later moved to his psychoticism construct, it is 
a facet of neuroticism in the NEO five-factor model, and corre-
lates to both extraversion and neuroticism (see Estrella Romero 
et al., 2006; also Carver et al., 2000). Additionally, in the five-
factor model conscientiousness or constraint is supposed to reflect 
impulse control. Impulsivity is part of reactive behavior controlled 
by the ventral systems. Although ventral effortful control and reac-
tive harm avoidance can produce constrained, feedback control 
of ongoing cognition and action (Tucker and Williamson, 1984), 
the direct control of behavior by emotional stimuli of the moment 
produces emotional reactive, impulsive behavior. This emotionally 
reactive kind of impulsivity is seen in internalizing and external-
izing disorders (see also Reed and Derryberry, 1995). However, 
aspects of proactive behavior can also be described as impulsive. 
The lack of feedback control of ongoing cognition and action in 
the proactive mode, and also its opposition of reactive avoidance 
and inhibition, can be experienced and labeled as impulsive. In 
fact, Tucker and colleagues used to stress this kind of impulsivity 
related to proactive, feedforward function in previous writings 
(Tucker et al., 1995).
Figure 3 suggests that reactive approach or impulsive reward 
responding can be regulated in at least three different ways: (1) 
by inhibition or regulation from the proactive system (proactive 
inhibition); (2) by inhibition or opposition from the reactive avoid-
ance system if punishments are involved (reactive inhibition); (3) 
by effortful control or constraint within the reactive approach sys-
tem itself. Additionally, proactive approach and impulsivity can 
be inhibited by reactive inhibition and possibly be regulated by 
effortful control. Research until now did not simultaneously take 
those different forms of inhibition of approach into account, but 
usually focused on dichotomies.
proacTive and reacTive goal-direcTed behavior
A final issue of conceptual confusion we would like to address 
within our framework is the relationship of behavioral programs 
with “goal-directedness.” In two-system models the cognitive 
control-type system is often described as supporting goal-directed 
behavior, while in the reactive-type system the reactivity is inter-
preted as being opposite to internal goal-directed. However, in our 
approach, drives and motivation are central to all four behavioral 
programs. The difference is how they are expressed, e.g., in proac-
tive or reactive behavior. In a proactive mode, context models can 
assist in directing behavior toward goals. In a reactive mode, goals 
and motivational stimuli can be held active by the redundancy bias 
and actually lead to perseveration or obsessional behavior (Tucker 
and Williamson, 1984).
summary
The present model suggests a reorganization of conceptual space 
in psychology. It suggests that certain behavioral characteristics 
that are usually contrasted with each other may actually belong 
to the same behavioral control system. At the same time, it sug-
gests that some other characteristics belonging to different con-
trol systems are typically not discriminated. We think confusion in 
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